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Abstract 
Fund managers play an important role in increasing efficiency and stability in 
financial markets. But research also indicates that fund management in certain 
circumstances may contribute to the buildup of systemic risk and severity of 
financial crises. The global financial crisis provided a number of new experiences 
on the contribution of fund managers to systemic risk. In this article, we focus on 
these lessons from the crisis. We distinguish between three sources of systemic 
risk in the financial system that may arise from fund management: insufficient 
credit risk transfer to fund managers; runs on funds that cause sudden 
reductions in funding to banks and other financial entities; and contagion through 
business ties between fund managers and their sponsors. Our discussion relates 
to the current intense debate on the role the so-called shadow banking system 
played in the global financial crisis. Several regulatory initiatives have been 
launched or suggested to reduce the systemic risk arising from non-bank 
financial entities, and we briefly discuss the likely impact of these on the sources 
of systemic risk outlined in the article. 
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1 Fund Management and Systemic Risk - Lessons from the Global 
Financial Crisis 
 
That financial crises typically have wide-ranging effects is a well-established fact. 
The global financial crisis (GFC) is certainly no exception. It even had an impact 
on the way the financial system is conceptualized. The understanding of how 
markets, financial actors and instrument function, interact and relate to each 
other has evolved considerably since the first signs of financial stress appeared 
in spring 2007. 
 
This article relies on the experiences from the GFC to discuss new insights on 
how fund management can contribute to systemic risk.1 Fund managers (FMs) 
are understood as a form of institutional investor whose principal purpose is to 
attain high risk-adjusted returns for their clients. In this article, we seek to 
distinguish between traditional fund managers (TFMs) and hedge funds (HFs) 
whenever such a distinction is meaningful and possible. Institutional investors – 
including FMs- have a number of well-known efficiency and stability enhancing 
features that decrease overall systemic risk.2 However, it is also widely 
recognized that institutional investors can contribute to systemic risk by making 
asset prices stray away from fundamentals, and fuelling financial bubbles and 
procyclicality through herding behavior (c.f. surveys by Bikhchandani and 
Sharma 2000; Borio et al. 2001). 
 
Yet, the experiences of the GFC showed that FMs may contribute to systemic 
risk in other ways than merely fuelling financial bubbles.3 In this article, we use 
recent research coupled with empirical and anecdotal evidence to describe a 
number of ways in which FM can contribute to systemic risk. We distinguish 
between three ways that was largely overlooked prior to the crisis: credit risk 
transfer to FMs; runs on FMs and financial markets; and business ties between 
FMs and sponsors. Our insights are also compared and contrasted with the 
existing literature on FM and financial stability.4 
                                                 
1
 In this article, systemic risk is defined as the risk of failure of one or several systemically 
important financial institutions.  
2
 Among other things, institutional investors provide opportunities to diversify, hedge and insure 
risk; and they provide liquidity to and facilitate efficient functioning of markets (Davis and Steil 
2001). They also reduce the (relative) weight of and thus systemic importance of banks in credit 
intermediation (Davis 2000). Unlike banks, they do not tend to take on excessive risk due to 
mispriced safety nets (Schich 2008). 
3
 Other asset managers than FMs may also, and have in different shapes and degrees, 
contributed to systemic risk through the channels covered in this article. This topic is however 
beyond the scope of this article, and is to some extent covered elsewhere (c.f. Mezzacapo 
2009 for sovereign wealth funds). 
4
 While the distinction of the three ways FM contribute to systemic risk is useful for analytical 
purposes, in reality manifestation of systemic risk from FM is likely to be an outcome of an 
interaction between several sources (both those covered in this article, and other sources 
identified in the body of research on FM and systemic risk). Also, we omit potential systemic 
risk stemming from banks’ investments in fund shares. 
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The topic of how FM may contribute to systemic risk is highly relevant in light of 
the ongoing regulatory reform that the fund management industry is facing. 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) has launched a substantial programme to 
consider ways in which systemic risk from shadow banking –which many 
consider some forms of FM a part of – can and should be mitigated through 
regulatory reform (FSB 2011). Also, considerable reform on money market funds 
(MMFs) is already underway in the US (c.f. McCabe 2012).  
 
The remained of this article is outlined as follows: In sections 2-4, we discuss the 
three new insights on ways in which FMs contribute to systemic risk. In Section 
5, we conclude by reflecting on the findings in light of the general financial 
stability literature. We also briefly discuss how regulatory reform to date and 
regulatory initiatives being considered may impact on the three identified ways in 
which FMs may contribute to systemic risk. 
 
 
2 Credit risk transfer to FMs 
 
The availability of other channels of credit intermediation than banks (such as 
fund managers) may enhance stability of a financial system and reduce systemic 
risk. But during the GFC, it also became clear that credit risk transfer (CRT) from 
originating banks to fund managers (and other market participants) can 
contribute to systemic risk. A brief overview of the main CRT instruments and 
markets, as well as the role played by FMs is provided below. Thereafter, we 
review research and anecdotal evidence on situations where credit risk transfer 
to FM has contributed and could contribute to systemic risk. 
 
 
Credit risk transfer to FMs - Background 
 
CRT can be separated into direct transfer of the underlying asset that bears 
credit risk (“funded instruments”), or synthetic transfer of credit risk using credit 
derivatives (“unfunded instruments”). The former category includes situations 
where an originating bank sells credit risk through transfer of traded loans 
(asset-backed securities or ABS:s), credit-linked notes, collateralized debt 
obligations etc. In the latter category, credit-linked securities (credit default 
swaps (CDSs)) are used to strip out and isolate the credit risk on the underlying 
asset and transfer it to another party. The party that buys protection from credit 
risk pays a premium to the protection seller, and receives protection if the 
underlying reference entity defaults (Andersen 2002). 
 
CRT derivatives come in various shapes and form, and are often very technical 
constructions. In order to simplicify, one often distinguishes between bespoke 
over-the-counter (OTC) and more standardized products. The tradability of the 
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standardized products has meant that markets for CRT have developed 
exponentially since the mid 90s (Kiff et al. 2003; Chan-Lau and Ong 2006). A 
decade later, by mid 00s, the gross market value of CDSs amounted to USD 294 
billion (BIS 2006).5 Although this a small proportion of total credit risk in the 
global financial system (cf. BCBS 2004), the amounts are nevertheless 
significant. 
 
In fact, the rapid growth in CRT markets is related to the huge expansion of FM 
in general and the HF segment in particular (CGFS 2008). FMs enter into both 
sides of transactions on CRT instruments, and invest in a variety of OTC and 
standardized instruments (both funded instruments and those providing synthetic 
risk transfer). Their business models have evolved in various ways to take 
advantage of the opportunities provided by CRT, including hedging, arbitrage 
trading or developing tailor-made investment products together with insurance 
companies and investment banks. In this sense, in the area of CRT, FMs have 
become both clients and competitors to the banks’ credit intermediation business 
(CGFS 2008). 
 
Whereas FMs played a minor role in CRT in its early stages, they have replaced 
insurance companies as the most visible and active non-bank participants in 
CRT in the last decade (Lescreawaet 2006; CGFS 2008). HFs held a market 
share of all synthetic protection sold corresponding to 2 percentage points in 
1999 (Andresen 2002). By end 2007, HFs’ market share had grown to 28 
percent (Duffie 2008). According to CGFS, HFs represented approximately half 
of US trading volume in structured credit markets in 2008 (CGFS 2008). 
Statistics on CRT demonstrates that, besides primary dealers and central 
clearing parties, HFs is the most important category of financial institution in 
offering credit protection on a net basis (see Table 1 below).  
 
<Table 1  Net credit protection bought by sector (notional amounts, USD bn 
June 2012)> 
 
TFMs adopted CRT at a more moderate pace and at a later stage. Nonetheless, 
in recent years TFMs have become more active in their role as protection seller 
(Chan-Lau and Ong, 2006). There are mainly two types of TFMs that rely sell 
protection as part of their investment strategies and adjust their credit exposures: 
Enhanced/dynamic money funds that seek to achieve above money market rates 
by investing in (among others) CRT while simultaneously providing daily or near 
daily liquidity; and specialized credit funds that seek long credit exposure 
through CRT (CGFS 2008). 
 
Non-bank entities that engage in the management of the various risk associated 
with providing credit, can improve the stability of the financial system by 
spreading risk, contribute to better allocation and pricing of credit risk, and by 
                                                 
5
 The real size of CRT is in any case smaller than the notional amounts provided above, which 
may give a misleading picture of the amount of risk actually transferred. 
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offering opportunities for banks or other systemic firms to reduce credit risk 
exposure and leverage (Duffie 2007; Kiff et al. 2003).6 Moreover, alternative 
credit intermediation channels may prove a vital substitute for borrowers in times 
when trouble in the banking system restricts the banks’ lending capacity (IMF 
2002).  
 
In fact, prior to the CFG, most regulatory and supervisory authorities highlighted 
the benefits of CRT in reducing systemic risk (e.g. FSA 2002; IMF 2002; OECD 
2002; IAIS 2003; BCBS 2004). The fact that none of the shocks the global 
financial system experienced in 2001-2002 had severe repercussions on 
financial stability was in part attributed to CRT by many observers (IMF 2002; 
BIS 2002; Persaud 2002).7 
 
 
Credit risk transfer to FMs - Lessons from the GFC  
 
While FMs have contributed to the depth and scope of the CRT markets, 
including market liquidity and price efficiency (CGFS 2008), their involvement of 
FM in these markets has nevertheless been shown to pose at a threat to 
financial stability. If FMs run into trouble, this may contaminate the banking 
sector and lead to an interruption in credit provisioning with potentially systemic 
consequences. 
 
Firstly, CRT has led to the creation of new types of relationships between 
financial actors (credit protection buyers and sellers), which has strengthened 
the links between various sub-sectors of the financial system (Kiff et al. 2003; 
Andersen 2002). As part of this, the transfer of credit risk from originator to FM 
has increased interconnectedness between banks and FMs. Interconnectedness 
is a well-documented channel of potential contagion that may disrupt the 
functions of the financial system (cf. BCBS 2010). It is typically more 
accentuated in cases where the links between actors are less visible, which is 
particularly the case for relationships created between originators and actors that 
are subject to relatively little regulatory and supervisory scrutiny. The reason is 
that it makes tracking of true credit and counterparty risk more challenging 
(Andersen 2002; IMF 2002; CGFS 2003). This problem is arguably particularly 
severe in the case of CRT to HFs, since they are less transparent and more 
complex than most other financial firms (Lescreawaet 2006; Kambhu et al. 2007) 
and have overtaken insurance companies as the dominant credit protection 
                                                 
6
 Distributing risk among a wider range of financial actors, particularly outside the banking 
system, may reduce systemic risk in various ways (cf. Duffie 2007; Wagner 2006; Kiff et al. 
2003). For instance, it may allow banks to replace single large exposures with a more 
diversified credit portfolio (replicating a syndicated loan). Transferring credit risk from banks to 
other entities that are less pivotal to liquidity provisioning may also reduce systemic (liquidity) 
risk. By improving pricing and allocation of risk, CRT may also be welfare-enhancing (cf. Duffie 
and Rahi 1995; Allen and Gale 1994). 
7
 These shocks include the first synchronized slowdown of the globalization era, the September 
11 attacks, and the bursting of the Dotcom-bubble. 
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sellers (Vause 2010). This, in turn, also makes the distribution of risk in the 
financial sector as a whole harder to observe from a macro-prudential 
perspective.  
 
Secondly, the transfer of credit risk from banks to FMs may in reality be 
insufficient. This means that risks can remain in systemic institutions (particularly 
in the banking sector), but may elude supervisory oversight and lead systemic 
institutions to have insufficient ability to absorb losses from the manifestation of 
such risk (cf. Merrit et al. 2001; Tolk 2001; Kessler and Levenstein 2001; O´Kane 
and McAdie 2001).  
 
The nature of such insufficient risk transfer differs depending on whether the risk 
transfer is funded or unfunded. Funded risk transfers may still expose the 
originating bank to credit risk, in case it has committed liquidity lines for the 
various funding vehicles typically used in such transactions (SPVs, SIVs etc). In 
addition, implicit guarantees to absorb credit and/or liquidity risk to preserve 
reputation or franchise values also expose the originating bank to risk (IMF 2002; 
BIS 2002b). In the GFC, such implicit guarantees made a large number of banks 
in Europe and the US suffer huge losses and had a severe impact on their 
capital ratios and liquidity positions (see further Section 4). 
 
For unfunded risk transfers, the incompleteness relates to the process of 
settlement following the trigger event. In that process, protection seller might 
delay payment, refuse to pay, or litigate the claim that a credit event has 
occurred. Although market participants have developed an orderly process for 
fulfilling credit derivatives contracts (Cole et al.  2007), the process remains 
largely untested and it still characterized by uncertainty (as demonstrated by the 
Greece case (cf. Buttonwood 2012)). In these cases, a proportion of risk 
nevertheless remains with the originating banks. In fact, as anecdotal evidence 
of the importance of such risk, credit rating agencies issue ratings of insurance 
companies’ willingness to compensate their credit protection buyers when a 
credit event seemingly has occurred (Kiff et al. 2003).8  
 
Insufficient risk transfer also occurs in the sense that while the originating bank’s 
credit risk may have decreased, it may under certain circumstances merely have 
been transformed into counterparty credit exposure that bears credit risk (Cole et 
al. 2007).  In case losses occurred on credit derivatives causes a counterpart 
failure, the bank will nevertheless suffer a loss from that counterpart exposure.9 
 
 
Systemic risk and credit risk transfer to FMs  
                                                 
8
 For a detailed discussion on credit risk manifestation in actual HF failures, see for instance 
Chany et al. 2005. 
9 The case of AIG (albeit not a fund manager but an insurer) illustrate the counterparty credit risk 
associated with CRT. A number of generic problems associated with adverse selection and 
moral hazard in CRT transactions are discussed in CGFS (2003). 
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The lessons from the GFC show that while CRT may increase resilience of the 
financial system, CRT may still act as a potential source of systemic risk. Though 
prior shocks to the global financial system did not cause much turbulence in CRT 
markets, the uncertainties surrounding the developments in Greece and the 
various implicit guarantees that had to be fulfilled by sponsoring banks point to a 
potential source of concern. Also, in light of the fact that FMs is the most 
important non-bank participants in CRT, interconnectedness between fund 
management and other (potentially systemic) sectors of the financial system has 
increased.  
 
The above mentioned types of systemic risk – interconnectedness and 
insufficient risk transfer - may also reinforce other forms of systemic risk that 
may emanate from FMs, in case they cause second round effects through the 
market channel (see Section 3) or through business ties (see Section 4).  
 
 
3 Runs on FMs and financial markets 
 
The GFC also showed that the risk of a run on a fund had been seriously 
underestimated by practitioners, regulators and academics. The manifestation of 
such liquidity risk ended up threatening the stability in the funding of banks and 
shut down important credit and money markets (which fed into bank funding 
difficulties through its impact on repos and other securities finance transactions). 
Runs on funds and runs on markets by fund managers is the second source of 
systemic risk from FMs covered in this article. Prior research and evidence on 
this topic is summarized in this section. 
 
 
Runs on FMs and financial markets - Background 
 
Fund managers are important providers of funding to financial institutions, 
businesses and governments (FSB 2011). According to recent estimates, 
European TFMs hold 25% in total securities other than shares issued by 
Eurozone entities (Delbecque 2012). Subcategories of fund managers can be 
particularly important to certain market segments; for instance, US MMFs held 
almost 40% of the outstanding volume of commercial papers (CPs) by mid-2008 
(Baba et al. 2009).  Table 2 below outlines estimates on the amounts held by 
MMFs in a selection of important money and fixed income markets in the Euro 
area: 
 
<Table 2 Fixed income and money instruments issued by various sectors 
held by Euro area MMFs (percentage of outstanding volumes end 
2011)>  
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As frequent buyers and sellers of financial securities, they contribute to the 
pricing and liquidity of a multitude of financial markets. In addition, unlike banks, 
funds have been thought to be immune to runs. Banks’ time horizons for lending 
and borrowing are mismatched. In combination with convertibility of deposits into 
fixed amounts of cash, this makes banks prone to runs (Diamond and Dybvig 
1983). Funds, on the other hand, do not promise fund investors their money 
back.10 In return, investors benefit from a higher expected return. Furthermore, 
information asymmetries are lower, as funds are more transparent and the value 
of their assets is usually more observable compared to the value of the assets of 
a bank (Scott 1998). Another explanation why fund are not prone to runs, is that 
fund investors know they would bear the costs of triggering a descending price 
spiral on the funds’ assets. Therefore, fund investors are more likely refrain from 
making additional investments rather than redeeming fund units (Klapper et al. 
2004). Taken together, this means that fund have been able to provide stable 
funding to other financial intermediaries. In that sense, funds have been seen as 
important safeguards of financial stability 
 
Empirical evidence from before the GFC seems to corroborate these theoretical 
explanations. Miles (2001) concluded that investors perceive MMFs to be safer 
than ordinary banks. Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) found that investors do not 
run from MMFs even as defaults on CPs increase. In fact, some evidence 
suggests that inflows into certain types of funds (primarily short-term credit funds 
including MMFs) increase during times of financial turbulence and market-wide 
liquidity shocks (Miles 2001; Pennacchi 2006). This evidential fact was also 
strengthened during certain periods of the GFC, as conservatively managed 
MMFs gained substantial inflows when the financial turbulence arose. In the US, 
the total assets under management (AuM) by MMFs increased by 20% in 2008 
(Baba et al. 2009). 
 
Taken together, FMs contribution to market functioning in combination with an 
absence of runs has been taken as evidence of their contribution to financial 
stability. Whereas a bank run may lead to a contraction in credit supply with 
macroeconomic consequences (Bernanke 1983), funds´ have been able to 
provide stable funding to other financial intermediaries. For those reasons, 
market participants, scholars, central bankers and other policymakers have all 
recognized that fund management contribute significantly and positively to 
financial stability (Kohn 2008).  
 
 
Runs on FMs and financial markets – Lessons from the GFC 
 
Exceptions to this view were rare. However, Edwards (1995) and Stigum and 
Crescenzi (2007) conclude that that if a fund who offers a fixed par value (i.e. 
constant net asset value or CNAV) that it cannot uphold, a run is plausible. Also, 
                                                 
10
 Investors may however perceive that the fund manager guarantees that returns will be at least 
not negative for certain hedge or constant net asset value (CNAV) funds. 
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Lyon (1984) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) remark that investors have 
incentives to run on a fund, if its assets are subject to uncertain valuation (due to 
accounting uncertainty, liquidity premium etc). Davies (2003) argues that it 
cannot be ruled out that non-banks may need direct public sector rescues in the 
future. During the GFC, all their apprehensions manifested. Funds became 
subject to runs, which in turn contributed to runs on various credit and money 
markets. 
 
 
Runs on TFMs 
 
The events that unfolded primarily concerned MMFs. The oldest CNAV MMF in 
the US, the Primary Fund, had up to the GFC gained market share by investing 
in higher-yielding paper, including Lehman Brothers notes (Stecklow and 
Gullapalli 2008). In mid-September 2008, the fund manager announced that the 
shares in the fund were worth a mere 97 cents, and a run on the fund was 
triggered (Mishkin 2010). Within four days, investors had redeemed 97% of the 
fund shares (Baba et al. 2009). 
 
The debacle of the Primary Fund set off broad shareholder redemptions, similar 
to a broad-ranging bank run (Fender et al. 2008). This not only affected other 
funds of the fund manager in question, but spread to US MMFs more generally, 
even though no other fund had “broken the buck”.11 Studying these events, 
Schmidt et al. (2011) found that flows across funds with similar risk 
characteristics became strongly correlated during this period. Other prime CNAV 
fund suffered redemptions, while sovereign funds received inflows, as fund 
investors fled to safety (Baba et al. 2009). Institutional fund investors accounted 
for the initial and large redemptions, while retail investors followed at a slower 
pace (Baba et al. 2009; Schmidt et al. 2011; Witmer 2012). Contagion across 
FMs was a fact. 
 
However, while CNAV funds suffered the largest runs (Witmer 2012), other 
MMFs were also affected (Gordon and Gandia 2012). In Europe, the enhanced 
MMF segment suffered a similar fate.12 Downgrades and initiated reviews on a 
number of distressed subprime transactions by major rating agencies (S&P, 
Moody’s, Fitch and Dominion) triggered a broad-based run on European MMFs. 
Certain funds, being heavily exposed to subprime assets, lost vast amounts of 
                                                 
11
 Although reporting an unbroken buck, Reserve’s $10 billion US Government Fund received sell 
orders corresponding to 60% of its AuM (Baba et al. 2009). 
12
 Enhanced (or alternatively dynamic, absolute performance or absolute return) MMFs seek to 
bridge the gap between traditional MMFs and bond funds, by pursuing higher returns – for 
instance 30 basis points above inter-bank borrowing rates – by taking on additional risk. This is 
achieved by investing in longer-dated and more volatile instruments such as short-term bonds, 
currencies and arbitrage on credit instruments (Standard & Poor’s 2007). While some are 
conservatively managed, others may include varying levels of exposure to collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs) and commercial papers (CPs) offered out of structured investment vehicles 
(such as asset backed commercial papers (ABCPs)) (Fitch Ratings 2006). 
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their AuM within days. But MMF investors had little possibility to distinguish 
between funds that were exposed to these transactions and those that were not 
(Bengtsson 2012). On aggregate, the fund segment lost around 21% of total 
AuM in the third quarter of 2007 (Kragenbring 2007). Several fund managers 
imposed haircuts on CNAV fund shares, closed funds to redemptions or even 
liquidated funds (Bengtsson 2012). Also, support from sponsoring banks was 
also extended to a number of funds in the US and the EU (see further Section 4).  
 
 
Runs on HFs 
 
Hedge funds have a longer history of runs, primarily due to their leveraged 
structure and funding by securities financing (c.f. Kambhu et al. 2007). LTCM 
and Amaranth Advisors are two examples of funding illiquidity through a run on 
funds’ repo and other types of short term financing. Even though both these 
funds had a reported (albeit questionable) positive equity, they were unable to 
meet margin calls on their short term funding (Kinga and Maier 2009). 
 
During the GFC, this type of HF runs reoccurred. In summer of 2007, HFs 
managed by Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns were having trouble meeting 
margin calls and lost funding (Brunnermeier 2009). The hedge funds’ sponsors 
stepped in with liquidity support (see further Section 4), but eventually the funds 
were wound down as the losses on mortgage-backed securities the funding 
markets had anticipated finally materialized (Dwyer and Tkac 2009). 
 
 
Runs on banks and markets 
 
The runs on investment and hedge funds had a direct impact on financial 
stability. Firstly, the various support actions taken had a direct knock-on effect on 
the sponsoring banks’ liquidity and capital positions. Secondly, redemptions 
forced up average maturities in the fund managers’ portfolios, which combined 
with an anticipation of further redemptions led fund managers to increase 
investments in very short term cash-like instrument (Baba et al. 2009; Bengtsson 
2012). In many banking systems in Europe and the US, the supply of short term 
funding dropped sharply (Baba et al. 2009; Mishkin 2010). In certain countries, 
the run on MMFs strongly contributed to the downfall of the banking system as 
its funding dried out (Gunnarsdottir and Strömqvist 2010). A similar pattern was 
observable in the summer of 2011, as US MMFs pulled out of European banks 
and putting pressure on the banks’ dollar-denominated funding and trading 
(Duygan-Bump et al. 2012). 13 
 
                                                 
13
 Shifts in composition and maturity of fund assets are also affected by – inter alia - credit market 
conditions, market liquidity and level of interest rates. In general, however, reductions in credit 
risk are usually accompanied by maturity extension to maintain sufficient yields (cf. Baba et al. 
2009) 
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But the fund-runs also contributed to financial instability indirectly, through 
affecting the functioning of credit and money markets. In the end, fund runs 
contributed to a wide-ranging liquidity crunch. The potential for such “market-
runs” resulting from runs on (an) individual fund(s) had been conceived by 
Edwards (1995) and Davies (2003). The underlying notion is that if many 
institutional investors simultaneously seek to shift asset allocations, market 
liquidity may collapse.14 This in turn may hinder issuances and rolling over of 
debt for those banks, other financial intermediaries and firms that rely on these 
markets for their funding. While previous market breakdowns had only affected 
minor idiosyncratic markets (cf. Davies 1999), during the GFC such market 
liquidity crunches affected major credit and money markets. 
 
As described in FSB (2011), Baba (et al. 2009), Bengtsson (2012), Duygan-
Bump (et al. 2012) and others, when fund managers and other intermediaries 
unwound their exposure to longer-term and more risky assets, prices started 
falling which triggered further sales. Eventually, the negative price-sales spiral 
caused a liquidity crunch on several fixed income and money markets. Though 
the herding of cash (driven by regulation or market requirements) may have 
been rational from the  individual fund managers’ perspective, the consequences 
of the collective action of all fund managers, other intermediaries and market 
participants led to detrimental consequences for both CPs and certificate of 
deposits (CDs) markets (Baba et al. 2009). Repo markets were also affected, as 
non-agency mortgage-backed/ABS collateralized repos experienced a run, 
although agency and treasury repo markets were largely unaffected (FSB 2011; 
Krisnamurthy et al. 2011). Chernenko and Sunderam (2012) find empirical 
evidence that redemptions from investment funds did impair the functioning of 
money market. And while runs on TFMs doubtlessly contributed to a liquidity 
crunch during the GFC, there is also empirical evidence that show when HFs 
experience shocks to their funding liquidity, the market liquidity of the asset 
classes that they trade is reduced (Aragon and Strahan 2011). 
 
Fears of another run on funds with accompanying market liquidity problems 
emerged in 2011, as the European sovereign crisis unfolded. Chernenko and 
Sunderam (2012) attribute a “quiet run” on US MMFs to their exposure to 
European banks. AuM of US prime MMFs fell by 10% in summer 2011, 
according to the US mutual fund industry association (Investment Company 
Institute (ICI).  
Such redemption pressures, coupled with the fact that MMFs are significant 
investors in EU sovereigns, made the US Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(2011) and others raise concern that another liquidity crunch would occur 
(Duygan-Bump et al. 2012). It is also noteworthy that several MMFs shut to 
                                                 
14
 All asset reallocation are of course not driven only by fund investors and fund managers, but 
also from “rational” herding by all kinds of investors. Yet, fund managers are prominent actors in 
many credit and money market (see statistics in Table 2) and therefore have a significant 
influence on the functioning of markets. 
This is a draft working paper which should not be referenced or quoted. 
12 
 
subscriptions to prevent pre-emptive runs as ECB lowered interest rates in July 
2012 (IOSCO 2012). 
 
In retrospect, it is striking that Davis’ (2003) prediction that funds would need 
public rescues in the future manifested during the GFC. In order to safeguard 
financial stability and curb systemic risk, US authorities launched liquidity 
facilities to aid an ailing fund sector in autumn 2008. Similarly, in a number of 
European jurisdictions, authorities offered guarantees or eased regulation to 
ease strains of their domestic fund industries (Bengtsson 2012). 
 
 
Systemic risk and runs on FMs and financial markets 
 
The notion that funds are run-proof and always contribute positively to the 
functioning of markets (c.f. Kohn 2008) has to be reconsidered in light of the 
experiences from the GFC. The run on MMFs confirms the hypotheses of 
Edwards (1995) and Stigum and Crescenzi (2007) that funds that cannot uphold 
a fixed par value will suffer runs. Also, the experiences from the HF segment 
confirm that if there is valuation uncertainty, investors will run (as predicted by 
Lyon (1984) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), despite the lower degree of 
information asymmetries compared to banks (c.f. Scott 1998). In hindsight, one 
may also question Miles’s (2001) conclusion that investors perceive MMFs to be 
safer than ordinary banks.  
 
Furthermore, the idea that investors refrain from running on a fund in fear of 
having to bear the costs of a descending price-spiral (c.f. Klapper et al. 2004) is 
challenged by the events of the GFC. Wide-spread runs on FMs had detrimental 
effects on market, with negative feed-back loops that fed further runs and 
ultimately severe funding difficulties for the banking system, as predicted by 
Edwards (1995) and Davies (1999; 2003).  
 
 
4 Business ties between FMs and sponsors 
 
A third channel by which FM can cause systemic risk is in cases where trouble of 
FM spill over on banks (or other systemic institutions) because they together 
form constituting parts of financial groups or conglomerates. In this article, we 
use the term business risk to cover the variety of risk manifestations that 
originate from business ties (credit, market, liquidity or operational) both on and 
off-balance sheet (cf. Dierick, 2004). In this section, we summarize prior 
research and evidence during and since the GFC on situations where banks 
have been contaminated by FM through the business risk channel. 
 
 
Business ties between FMs and sponsors - Background 
 
This is a draft working paper which should not be referenced or quoted. 
13 
 
Close business ties between FMs and banks through the existence of financial 
groups is a common feature in the financial services industry. Since the late 90s, 
banks have diversified into non-interest earning activities such as asset 
management. This trend is global, but particularly pronounced in Europe (Guiso 
et al. 2002). Nowadays, banking groups are important providers of FM services, 
although these services are typically offered through separately capitalized asset 
management subsidiaries (Rajan 2009; Bengtsson and Delbecque 2011).  
 
HFs are also related to banks by ownership, often by either holding a controlling 
share of votes or a minority stake ownership. JP Morgan Asset Management and 
Goldman Sachs Asset Management are two examples of the former. Morgan 
Stanley’s stakes in Lansdowne and Avenue Capital are examples of the latter 
(King and Maier 2009).  However, this type of relation is probably less common 
for HFs than for TFMs. Nine out of the twenty largest US mutual fund complexes 
in 2003 were affiliated with other institutions. By contrast, most hedge funds are 
independently run companies that are not affiliated with any other institution 
(Kahan and Rock 2007). However, data presented in Martin and Pescatore 
(2007) suggest that many of the largest US HFs are affiliated with large prime 
brokers and banks. Likewise, Garbaravicius and Dierick (2005) noted that many 
prime brokers increasingly began setting up in-house hedge funds. While there 
seems to be no readily-available data on HF affiliation and TFM affiliation in the 
US, data from Lipper (2011) show that 12 out of the 15 largest TFMs in the EU 
are run by banks (see Table 3 below). This pattern of significant bank ownership 
of fund management companies is also corroborated by Bengtsson and 
Delbecque (2011). 
 
 
<Table 3 15 largest fund management companies by AuM and parent group 
in the EU (EUR bn end 2009)> 
 
Business ties between fund managers and other categories of financial services 
companies are often seen as strengthening the resilience of the associated 
companies to various types of risk. Thereby, business ties contribute to their 
financial soundness (Schilder and van Lelyveld 2002).15 There are two main 
reasons: diversification of various types of risk (liquidity, interest rate and 
currency risk); and cost and revenue synergies in – among others- risk 
management, distribution, marketing and administration.16 As resilience and 
soundness of the financial services companies improve, business ties between 
various types of financial firms contribute to financial stability and reduce 
systemic risk.  
                                                 
15
 There are no empirical studies on the implications of offering asset management and banking 
services within a conglomerate. Empirical evidence on the implications on profitability and value 
of conglomeration in financial services paints a mixed picture. For more discussion, see Elsas 
et al. (2010) or Van Lelyveld and Knot (2009). 
16
 For a more detailed discussion on the benefits of asset management offered in conjunction 
with other financial services, see Bengtsson and Delbecque (2011). 
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Business ties between FMs and sponsors – Lessons from the GFC 
 
However, whereas business ties between FMs and other financial companies 
may increase the resilience of the group, they may also serve as channels of 
contagion. Such contagion channels may transfer troubles experienced in the 
FM company to other companies in the financial group. They may relate to 
profitability and liquidity or capital support. In cases where companies within the 
same group as the FM are systemic to the financial system or overall economy, 
business ties may pose a threat to financial stability.17  
 
Research on how such business risk from FMs may threaten the financial health 
of the sponsoring company or the financial group is rare (one exception is 
Christoffersen 2001). However, from a conceptual perspective, contagion 
through the business risk channel can be both direct and indirect. Direct 
channels of contagion include when the FM company makes losses, which in 
case of prudential consolidation reduces capital of the entire group. In case of 
non-consolidation, reduced profitability typically lowers dividends to the parent 
company and the shareholder value of the FM company. Indirect channels of 
contagion work through non-contractual obligations in the shape of contingent 
liabilities and commitments. In theory, such indirect channels should be limited in 
fund management. According to the contract, any losses suffered by a fund 
should be borne by the fund investors. 
 
However, in the GFC, evidence of both indirect and direct contagion appeared. 
Firstly, parent companies in financial groups issued implicit guarantees to absorb 
various risks of fund investors (Bengtsson 2012; Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2011; 
Wiethuechter 2010; Kinga and Maier 2009). This means that risk carried by fund 
investors was transferred back onto the parent bank's balance sheet. According 
to Brady et al. (2012), at least 21 CNAV MMFs would have been unable to 
maintain a stable NAV without sponsor support during the GFC.  Secondly, direct 
support was provided in three distinct forms (although sponsoring companies 
relied on various combinations of support forms in practice): 
 
1. Foregoing fees 
Fund managers did forego fees in order to enhance the return to the fund 
investors. In cases where the fund manager is owned by another financial 
firm, such foregoing of fees damages the capital position not only of the 
fund management company, but also the parent company and the group 
as a whole. Bengtsson (2012) documents several cases of MMF 
managers waiving fees during the initial stages of the GFC. For 2011, 
Greene (2012) reports that money funds on aggregate waived around 
                                                 
17
 Indeed, the issue whether whether diversification benefits also apply in times of stress has 
been discussed (c.f. Santomero and Eckles 2000). Also, efficiencies from conglomeration may 
turn into inefficiencies under certain conditions (c.f. Schilder and Lelyveld 2002). 
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$2.3bn in fees, while collecting $4.7bn. More recently, in the European 
sovereign debt crisis, rating agencies expected fee reductions to maintain 
positive returns (Funds Europe 2012).18 
 
2. Liquidity support 
 
Sponsoring companies provided liquidity support to funds managed by 
other companies in the same financial group, when those funds suffered 
net redemptions or margin calls. Liquidity support was rather common 
during the GFC. In its initial stages, several HFs were supported by their 
parent companies. Examples include Goldman Sachs and BearSterns in 
early 2007 (Kinga and Maier 2009). Despite not having any contractual 
obligations, the latter lent US$ 3.2 billion to a single HF as the market 
realized that the fund had trouble meeting margin calls (Brunnermeier 
2009). Also, several MMFs domiciled in Luxembourg took out short-term 
loans from their parent banks to meet redemptions (CSSF 2008; OECD 
2010). 
 
As long as the parent company does not suffer from liquidity shortages or 
troubles refinancing its operations, such liquidity support is unproblematic. 
However, experiences from the GFC showed that parent banks 
themselves suffered liquidity shortages as a consequence of them 
providing support (Brunnermeier 2009).  
 
 
3. Capital support  
 
During the GFC sponsors took on losses from the fund by purchasing 
assets below market value, or guaranteeing the value of the fund’s assets. 
The fact that only one single US MMF failed to maintain its CNAV during 
the last decade, is primarily due to sponsors supporting the value of funds’ 
assets (Baba et al. 2009; FSB 2011). Although Moody’s (2010) shows that 
between 1980 and 2009, over 200 funds benefitted from sponsor support 
in Europe and in the United States, the frequency of support peaked 
sharply in 2007-2009. According to Moody’s (ibid), in Europe a total of 26 
investment funds received parent support between August 2007 and 
December 31 2009. Evidence reviewed by Bengtsson (2012) indicates 
that the bulk of this support occurred in the turbulent post-Lehman autumn 
of 2008. Support was predominantly provided through asset purchases. 
For instance, AXA, Société Générale and Credit Suisse all took bought 
assets from funds managed by their asset management subsidiaries 
(Schultes and Wilson 2007; Crouchy and Turnbull 2008; Standard & 
Poor’s 2008; Cobley 2008). But guaranteeing the value of fund asset also 
                                                 
18
 Christoffersen (2001) has shown that foregoing fees was common among low-performing 
funds generally, and particularly among high-performing retail oriented funds during the 80s and 
90s. 
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occurred (Standard & Poor’s 2008; Bengtsson 2012). 
 
Similar observations were made in the US. Up to the outburst of the GFC, 
around 145 of US MMF benefitted from capital support from their 
sponsors (Crane Data Archives 2008). During the GFC, the frequency 
increased dramatically. Around a third of the top 100 US MMFs and 20 
percent of all US MMF received financial support from management 
companies (Crane Data Archives 2008; FSB 2011). While it is difficult to 
calculate the value or potential impact on the sponsor from giving support, 
it is clear that the potential magnitude is considerable. According to 
estimates by Bank of England (2012), the AuM of sponsored MMF ranged 
between USD 15-80 bn for European banks, and USD 50-375 bn for US 
banks. This corresponded to up to 170% and 1300% respectively of the 
EU and US banks’ core tier 1 capital. 
 
 
Recent research, based on experiences from the GFC, suggest that there are at 
least three reasons why parent companies of financial groups may support a FM 
company despite not being bound to do so by contract. The first concern 
reputation and/or a wish to preserve the franchise value of their firm (Kinga and 
Maier 2009). A second reason may stem from the parent company holding 
common or similar positions as the fund in questions, and would suffer losses if 
the assets of the fund were liquidated. Finally, the parent company may rely on 
funding from the fund, and may seek to prevent disruption to their funding 
channel (see further Section 3). In fact, research has shown that sponsoring 
companies provide support even to uphold market functioning in periods of 
market distress (Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2011). While these reasons may be 
distinguished in theory, in reality a decision to support a fund (manager) within a 
financial group is probably often based on several of the above reasons. 
 
Systemic risk and business ties between FMs and sponsors  
 
The GFC showed that the business ties between banks and FMs give rise to 
business risks. The numerous events where sponsors’ capital and liquidity 
positions worsened due to support of FMs, clearly show that while business ties 
may resilience of associated companies to various types of risk (c.f. Schilder and 
van Lelyveld, 2002), it can also contribute to systemic risk. Thus, while business 
ties between fund managers and other categories of financial services 
companies are often seen as strengthening the associated companies (c.f. 
Schilder and van Lelyveld 2002), they  may also give rise to systemic risk. 
 
 
5 Discussion 
 
Fund management and systemic risk 
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Despite the numerous benefits offered by FMs to fund investors, the functioning 
of financial markets and the overall economy, the GFC has pointed to a number 
of ways FMs can contribute to systemic risk. In this article, we have used recent 
research coupled with anecdotal evidence to distinguish and discuss three novel 
ways in which FMs contribute to systemic risk. The numerous cases of direct 
and indirect policy support to FMs corroborate this view. 
 
While the presence of these systemic risks in the FM industry have previously 
been largely ignored by academics and policy makers alike, their basic 
underlying features are well-covered in the general literature and theory on 
financial stability.19 The risk of runs on FMs correspond closely to the view of the 
financial system accumulating risk over time (credit and liquidity risk in the case 
of FMs), which through feedback mechanisms eventually lead to imbalances. 
These imbalances subsequently cause the financial system to embark on a 
negative cycle with falling asset prices and increasing risk aversion.20 Likewise, 
both credit risk transfer to FMs and business ties between FMs and sponsors 
increase interconnectedness between entities and sectors of the financial 
system, which facilitate the transmission and spreading of difficulties through the 
financial system.21 Finally, the role of FMs in CRT has similarities with the well-
known systemic risk stemming from concentration of exposures.22 As FMs sells a 
significant part of all credit protection, this implies that credit protection buyers 
(such as banks) have a common and potentially concentrated exposure of 
counterparty risk.  
 
The well-known interrelatedness of these features of potential financial instability 
is also notable for systemic risk emanating from FMs. Kinga and Maier (2009) 
notes that contagion channels between banks and HF often are overlapping. 
This notion can be generalized to the three sources of systemic risk emanating 
from FMs discussed in this article. For example, as certain funds were put under 
credit watch by credit rating agencies due to uncertainty of availability of sponsor 
support, a run on these funds was triggered (IOSCO 2012). Another example is 
when deterioration in the value of sponsor support negatively impacted the 
counterparty risk of banks, insurance companies or other entities with CRT 
exposures to funds. 
 
Outlook on fund management and systemic risk 
 
In response to the newfound sources of systemic risk discussed in the previous 
sections, policymakers have not been idle. Much policy work is undertaken 
under the auspices of FSB’s program on shadow banking (2012a). There are 
also other initiatives that have bearing on the systemic risk in FM, both 
completed and underway. For instance, in the area of CRT, there is a general 
                                                 
19
 This section is based on the discussion in Borio and Drehmann (2009). 
20
 For a discussion, see for instance Minsky (1982) and Kindleberger (2000). 
21
 See for instance Rochet and Tirole (1996), Allen and Gale (2000), Kroszner (2010) etc. 
22
 See for instance Cifuentes et al. (2005), Allen and Gale (2004), Acharya et al. (2010). 
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regulatory drive towards exchange based trading and central clearing of credit 
derivatives by FSB (2012b). If successful, by centralized clearing, the 
counterparty risk exposures to FM through CRT should diminish. Several 
regulatory initiatives have also been launched to lower the risk of runs on funds. 
For instance, in the US, SEC (2009) enacted stricter requirements on credit 
quality, maturities and liquidity buffers in Rule 2a-7, which governs US MMFs.  In 
the EU, CESR (the predecessor of ESMA) imposed a new way of classifying 
MMFs in order to clearer distinguish between less and more risky types of MMFs 
in 2010. New regulation has also been introduced to sever the magnitude of 
support between FMs and their sponsors. The Basel Committee has 
strengthened requirements on considering reputational risk and implicit support 
in banks’ internal capital adequacy assessment process under Pillar 2; BCBS 
has also set out to develop policy recommendations on the appropriate scope of 
consolidation for sponsors to the FSB (FSB 2012a). Likewise, the issue of 
sponsor support is under scrutiny also in the EU, as indicated by the recent 
consultation document on investment funds (European Commission 2012). 
There are also initiatives to strengthen reporting requirements on FMs and the 
mandate of authorities to take measures to reduce the systemic risk they may 
give rise to (such as the EUs Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
(European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2011) or the so-called 
Dodd-Frank Act (United States Congress 2010). 
 
Whether there regulatory efforts will succeed in reducing systemic risk from FMs 
in the future is an open question. Since much of these regulation mentioned 
above is yet to be implemented or in many cases even completed, it still too 
early to tell. However, it is worth noting that many of the events described in this 
article took place even after regulatory measures to prevent their occurrences 
were enacted.23 Also, history tells us that business opportunities to provide 
financial services tend to be the greatest where the regulatory frictions are the 
least. For that reasons, the significant regulatory reform that is directed towards 
the banking sector (such as Basel III and the numerous efforts to curtail the too-
big to fail problem) will strengthen the incentives for financial activities to occur in 
alternative sectors of the financial system. Indeed, shadow banking – of which 
certain parts of the FM industry often considered- has emerged and expanded in 
many cases, as a consequence of the ordinary banking sector becoming subject 
to stricter regulation.24 
In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that policymakers are left with the 
daunting task of finding the right balance between restricting systemic risk 
emanating from particular sectors without increasing the risk of the financial 
system as a whole. 
 
                                                 
23
 For instance, there have been runs on FMs even after the changes to SEC’s Rule 2a-7 and 
CESR’s guidelines on fund classification. 
24
 See for instance Olson (2012) for a discussion. 
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ABS – Asset backed security; AuM – Assets under management; BBA – British 
Bankers’ Association; BCBS – Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; BIS – 
Bank for International Settlement; CD – Certificate of Deposit; CDS – Credit 
Default Swap; CESR – Committee of European Securities Regulators; CGFS – 
Committee on the Global Financial System; CNAV – Constant Net Asset Value; 
CP – Commercial Paper; CRT – Credit Risk Transfer; ESMA – European 
Securities and Markets Authority; FM – Fund Manager; FSA – Financial Services 
Authority; GFC – Global Financial Crisis; HF- Hedge Fund; IAIS – International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors; MMF - Money Market Fund; OTC – Over 
the Counter; TFM – Traditional Fund Manager. 
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Table 1  Net credit protection bought by sector (notional amounts, USD 
bn June 2012)  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BIS 
Note: Positive (negative) figures indicate net credit protection bought 
(sold) by category. The data presented omits the categories Reporting 
dealers and Central clearing parties. While these categories together 
represent a large of the CDS market, their net exposures are typically very 
limited. Insurance companies and financial guaranty companies include 
pension funds, while other types on managed funds (excluding hedge 
funds) are well-represented in the category Other residual financial 
customers (c.f. Vause 2011). 
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Table 2 Fixed income and money instruments issued by various 
sectors held by Euro area MMFs (percentage of outstanding 
volumes end 2011) 
 
 
Source: ECB, Balance Sheet Items (BSI). Securities Issue Statistics (SEC) 
Note: Data cover all debt instruments and short-term (up to 1 year) debt 
securities issues in the euro area. Government bills are estimated.  
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Table 3 15 largest fund management companies by AuM and parent 
group in the EU (EUR bn end 2009)  
 
 
Source: Lipper FMI/ThomsonReuters 
Note: Data covers AuM of European investment funds (UCITS only).  
 
